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Abstract 
The Woodhouse Report and the subsequent 1972 Accident Compensation Act was revolutionary. The right to sue to 
re~over compe~~atory damages arising directly or indirectly out of personal injury was abolished. although there was 
stzll the provzswn to take an action for damages in a court outside of New Zealand. Since then. workers· 
compensation in New Zealand has evolved and metamorphosed into our current scheme. However, the effectiveness of 
workers' compensation schemes in terms providing protecting injured workers and their dependents h~~ been eroded 
over the years. This paper not only provides a brief background to the current system but also explores the notion that 
if the current workers· compensation scheme is failing New Zealand workers. perhaps it is time to look a1 other 
alternatives. In particular. the tort system of law may afford workers fairer compensation and may spur employers to 
provide healthy and safe working environments. 
Introduction 
Most industrialised countries, including New Zealand, 
introduced workers' compensation schemes in the 
closing years of the 19th and early years of the 20th 
centuries. The early workers' compensation schemes 
were seen as experiments in social welfare and over the 
past 100 years the experiment has continued. From time 
to time the schemes have undergone major reforms, 
notably the introduction of the New Zealand Accident 
Compensation Act in 1974 which, based on an earlier 
report by Judge Woodhouse, created the distinctive 
universal. no-fault injury and rehabilitation 
compensation scheme that remains today. However. the 
New Zealand Accident Compensation scheme. which 
became know as ''the great experiment'', has had it 
critics. On one hand employer groups complain that the 
costs are out of control and harming productivity and 
competitiveness. On the other hand workers and trade 
unions complain that the sick and injured continue to 
bear too much of the costs of dangerous or unhealthy 
work conditions and argue that injw·ed workers and their 
families are impoverished by injury and disease. And 
those who deal with workers compensation complain that 
the system has become complex, large and 
bw-eaucratically impersonal. The question is whether the 
time has come to end the experiment or should the 
workers' compensation remain in its preset form? 
The purpose of this paper is to argue that if the workers' 
compensation systems have failed to meet the promise of 
the early architects of the scheme, then perhaps the 
experiment should end. The question would no longer 
be how best to fix or reform workers· compensation. but 
how to replace it. However, it is necessary to first remind 
ourselves of the rationale behind the New Zealand 
workers' compensation scheme and its basic principles. 
Brief Overview of Workers' Compensation 
Schemes 
Before workers· compensation schemes were introduced 
injured or ill workers or their dependants received little. 
if any compensation. in spite of the horrendous rates of 
occupational injuries. diseases and fatalities. Often the 
only compensation workers and their families recei\'ed 
was in the form of charity fl'om their employer or the 
community. Substantial public collections were taken up 
after disasters involving significant worker fatalities. 
such as the 1896 Brunner Mine Disaster on the West 
Coast of New Zealand, but such support was restricted to 
highly visible incidents and even then financial 
assistance was by no means guaranteed (Campbell. 
1996). Relying on employer or communi!) S)mpathy and 
public charity left many injured workers. '' idows and 
orphans in povetty (Purse, 2005: Armstrong. 2008). 
Better paid, usually skilled workers could however. take 
out a form of mutual insurance by joining a friendly 
society (such as the Oddfellows) or a trade union which 
offered sickness, funeral and other friendly or social 
benefits- a major function of many early unions. In 19th 
century New Zealand mutual insurance was the most 
common form of protection insurance. but only the best-
paid workers, such as craftsmen, could afford it. But 
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again seriously disabled workers would be impoverished 
by their injury. And only those with steady good paying 
jobs would be covered. because those who for whatever 
reason (such as temporary unemployment) could not 
afford to make payments would lose their cover (Lamm, 
2008). 
Injured workers tried to sue their employers in tort for 
intentional or negligent injw-y. The modern law of 
negligence arguably began in 1932 with the famous case 
of Donoghue v. Stevenson. The problem was. howe,·er, 
that workers rarely won when they tried to sue their 
employer in tort. During the 19th and early 20th 
centuries worker's tort claims were defeated by one or 
other legal doctrines (the so-called "unholy Trinity' ') -
namely: a) common employment; b) contributot') 
negligence: and c) volenti non .fit injuria (Purse. 2005). 
The first doctrine. common employmelll, rejects the 
liabi lity for the employer on the basis of the negligence 
of a eo-worker. Given the complexities of industrial 
production it was often easy to shO\\ that some employee 
or other negligence contributed to the worker' s injw-ies. 
Of course one could and did argue that the employer had 
an overriding duty as master to ensw-e the safety of his 
servants based in the contract of employment. but the 
courts seemed willing to ignore the potential contractual 
obligations when faced \\ith claims from injured 
workers. The second. doctrine. contribut01:r llef<ligence . 
meant that if the \Vorker's O\\TI carelessness contributed 
to the accident then the employer could not be held liable 
for compensation. In New Zealand and the passage of 
the Contributory Negligence Act in 1947 liability could 
not be app011ioned. The third doctrine. ro/enti 11011 .fit 
il~juria. held that those who 'olw1tarily unde11ook risky 
activities were asswned to have also \ oluntarilv 
-
assuming the risks of injury. Under this doctrine. 
employees. like rugby players today. could not sue for 
injury which was a reasonably foreseeable as a likely risk 
of the work acti\'ity. It is understandable therefore that 
workers and their unions ha\ e been highly suspicious of 
the cout1S (Rennie. 1995: Armstrong. 2008) 
The courts were not only hostile to workers for any 
number of reasons but also tort law \\as. by today's 
standards, quite unrecepth·e to negligence claims. 
Reasons for the courts· hostilit) to claims b) injured 
workers in those days are these days seen as political. At 
the turn of the 20th Century judges shared with 
employers a belief in the imp011ance of private property 
and the lower 'alue. both social!) and economicallv. of 
workers. The traditional rules regarding master and 
servant vvere enforced in ways that respected the 
managerial prerogatives of employers. Some judges may 
ha\'e sought to protect industry and thus employers fi·om 
the economic costs of injured \\'Orkers· claims. but they 
likely did so because they beJie,ed it \\TOng to penalize 
the employer who was prm iding '"'ork and thus wages 
for many workers for ut1foreseen and unintended 
accidental injut·y to one worker. It was better to 
impoverish the v,:orker than to bankrupt the employer 
(lamm. 2008). 
Given the problems suing employers for compensation 
for injw-y or illness, it as not surprising that the 
introduction of workers compensation schemes was seen 
a blessing but came as a result of years of political 
struggle on the part of workers, unions and other 
interested parties. With workers' compensation schemes, 
injut·ed workers had the benefit of an employer funded 
yet publicly run compensation scheme. 
The fi rst legislative workers' compensation scheme was 
introduced in Germany by Chancellor Bismarck in 1880. 
Similar schemes were introduced in England in 1897 
and over the next 30 years in Australia, the USA, 
Canada and New Zealand (Campbell, 1996; Cowan, 
I 997; Plumb and Cowell , 1998; Pw-se, 2005). With the 
establishment of workers' compensation, the legislation 
limited or removed the workers' right to sue their 
employer and established an administrat ive 
compensation scheme for injuries arising out of or in the 
cout·se of employment. The legislation was often 
described as a bargain or compromise as workers gave up 
the right to sue their employer for damages in tort for 
their injuries in exchange for more certain and quicker 
··no fault" compensation administratively determined. 
Workers' compensation ceased to be a matter for the 
cout·ts and new bureaucracies were born. 
The extension of a no-fault. or absolute liability, scheme 
to include all individuals in New Zealand was first 
seriously mooted in 1928 as part of the parliamentary 
debate that accompanied the introduction of the Motor 
Vehicles Insurance (Third-party rusk) Act. Almost a 
decade later, New Zealand came nearer to achieving 
comprehensive no-fault legislation with a drafted Bill, 
but in the face of strenuous opposition it was dropped 
(lamm, 2008). However, as comprehensive no-fault 
schemes were operating successfully in pru1s of Canada 
and the United States as early as 1946, the issue was 
again raised by some in the Labour Government. Many 
Labour politicians were of the opinion that as New 
Zealand was a signatory to ILO conventions concern ing 
no-fault workers' compensation, the government had an 
obligation to apply the ILO absolute liability principle to 
New Zealand workers' compensation legislation. 
However. such a scheme was not popular among many 
motorists and efforts to bring about an absolute liability 
Bill in 194 7 were blocked by the Member of Parliament 
for Palmerston North, who was prominent in the 
Automobile Association. 
During the 1960s there was growing disquiet over the 
limitations of the workers' compensation scheme in 
which payments had fa llen to 53% of the average weekly 
wage and which stopped altogether after six years even if 
the worker was quite incapacitated. In addition, the ILO 
Absolute Liability Workers' Compensation Convention 
121, 1964, provoked considerable interest in New 
Zealand and inspired the Minister for Labour, the Hon. 
T.P. Shand to declare: 
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I. 
' 
, 
) 
I frankly believe that the time has come for the 
abolition of common law claims for accidents in 
industry, but before contemplating taking away 
that right we must make up our minds that the 
alternative compensation provided in workers' 
compensation legislation must be more generous, 
full, and fitting than it is today. 
(Cited in Campbell, 1996: 42). 
Two years later the Government appointed a Royal 
Commission, chaired by the Hon. Owen Woodhouse, a 
Supreme Cowt Judge, to investigate compensation for 
personal injw-y. Numerous submissions were heard and 
various countries were visited, and the resulting 
Woodhouse Report went beyond its terms of reference 
and proposed a universal ' no-fault' system based on the 
five guiding principles listed and discussed below (J. 
Woodhouse, Royal Commission to Inquire into and 
Report upon Workers· Compensation, 1967: 39). 
1. Community responsibility. ' In the national 
interest, and as a matter of national obligation, the 
community must protect all citizens (including the 
self-employed) and the housewives who sustain 
them, from the burden of sudden individual losses 
when their ability to contribute to the general 
welfare by their work has been interrupted by 
physical incapacity.' 
2. Comprehensive entitlement. 'All injured persons 
should receive compensation from any community 
financed scheme on the same uniform method of 
assessment, regardless of the causes which gave 
rise to their injuries.' 
3. Complete rehabilitation. 'The scheme must be 
deliberately organised to w·ge forward the 
physical and vocational recovery of these citizens 
while at the same time providing a real measure 
of money compensation for their losses.· 
4. Real compensation. 'Real compensation demands 
for the whole period of incapacity, the provision 
of income-related benefits for lost income and 
recognition of the plain fact that any permanent 
bodily impairment is a loss in itself. regardless of 
its effect on earning capacity.' 
5. Administrative efficiency. 'The achievement of 
the system will be eroded to the extent that its 
benefits are delayed, or are inconsistently 
assessed, or the system itself is administered by 
methods that are economically wasteful. · 
Finally, after much debate, Parliament incorporated the 
five Woodhouse principles into the 1972 Accident 
Compensation Act. The Act established, for the first 
time, a ''no-fault" scheme that provides one source of 
compensation for personal injury, irrespective of who 
was at fault. The right to sue to recover compensatory 
damages arising directly or indirectly out of personal 
injury was abolished. although an action for damages 
could still be taken in a court outside New Zealand. In 
addition, the Act created the Accident Compensation 
Commission (ACC) responsible for the administration of 
the scheme. The government also introduced an 
'experience rating system' under the Accident 
Compensation Act whereby companies or the industry 
pay a levy according to the number of accidents that 
happen. This was in spite of the fact that it had been 
widely discredited by academics, practitioners and the 
Woodhouse Commission (Oliphant, 2004; Duncan; 
2007). Woodhouse believed that a levy system could not 
operate equitably and that such financial incentives 
would be insignificant for any substantial organisation, 
relatively unimportant for a small one, and non-existent 
in the public sector. The Report also argued that such a 
system could be open to corruption 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, ACC was totally 
committed to the loss-control perspective. It developed 
safety management programmes and supported tertiary 
degrees in safety management (Campbell, 1997). 
Nevettheless, there was a steady call from employers -
patticularly those in large businesses - to reduce 
workers' compensation costs (rather than bringing about 
a reduction in accidents, injuries and work-related 
diseases). In response, the newly elected National 
Government set about narrowing the compensation 
categories as a way of reducing the growing ACC debt 
and the employers' compliance costs. The legislation that 
followed, namely the Accident Rehabilitation 
Compensation Insurance Act 1992, was designed to 
contain the overall costs and reallocate them atnongst 
taxpayers and individuals paying premiums. The 
principle means of doing this were: 
• refocusing the scheme on its insurance origins, 
particularly by the use of experience rating and 
user part charges; 
• realigning the scheme with new health cat·e 
provisions to reduce the incentive to shift costs 
between illness and injwy schemes: 
• redistributing costs by allocating public health 
costs to the scheme and introducing a new 
earners· premium for non-work injuries, and 
• contammg costs by altering benefits and 
tightening scheme eligibility (for example. by 
abolishing lump-sum pa)'ments - this would 
gravely affect asbestos disease sufferers whose life 
expectancy is minimal) and unless physical injury 
was present, stress and mental injury were 
generally not covered. 
Fwthe1more. the most controversial pans of the Act were 
the alterations to the definitions of accident, work injw)', 
gradual process diseases and infection. The new 
definitions tightened the scope of claims accepted by the 
ACC as personal injw·y by accident. Claims for personal 
injuries could only be considered if the accident was a 
result of: 
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• a specific event external to the human body that 
results in personal injwy but does not include any 
gradual process; 
• the application of an external force or resistance 
that is abnormal in application and/or excessive in 
intensity. 
Narrowing the compensation categories as a way of 
restricting compensation entitlements generated 
widespread criticism (Armstrong, 2008). More changes 
were to come, however. In the late 1990s, ACC allowed 
accredited employers to manage their claims for up to 
two years. There was also a distinct policy shift by ACC 
to reduce the number of long-term ACC claimants. Each 
person with a significant injury became the responsibility 
of an individual ACC staff member and greater emphasis 
was placed on rehabilitation and returning injured 
workers back into the workforce. The effort by ACC to 
purge itself of long-term claimants, such as those 
involving occupational over-use injuries, set the scene for 
the introduction of private insw·ers into the workers' 
compensation market. Moreover, the National 
Government was keen to introduce competition into the 
state-run workers' compensation scheme and enacted the 
Accident Insurance Act in 1998. In effect, the 
government disengaged itself from workers' 
compensation altogether by creating a new Crown-owned 
enterprise in late 1998 specifically for workplace injury 
insurance, called @ Work Insurance (for more details, 
see Lamm, 2008). 
However, just as New Zealanders were coming to grips 
''~th the new legislation there was a change of 
government at the end of 1999 in which the Labour-
Alliance Coalition Government introduced Injwy 
Prevention. Rehabilitation. and Compensation Act. 2001. 
The Injury Prevention. Rehabilitation, and Compensation 
Act, 2001 differs from previous law in that it establishes 
injwy prevemion as a primary function of Accident 
Compensation Corporation. The Act specifies a new 
rehahilitation principle- namely, that rehabilitation is to 
be provided by the Corporation to restore the claimant's 
health, independence and participation to the maximum 
extent practicable and can make available a lump-sum 
payment for petmanent impairment. The intent of this 
change is to provide fairer compensation for those who, 
through impairment, suffer non-economic loss. This 
includes both physical impairment and mental injury 
(caused by a physical injury or sexual abuse). The Act 
fwther provides: a more flexible assessment of loss of 
earnings; a new formula for sening a minimum level of 
weekly compensation; more flexible provisions for self-
employed people, and simplified regulations concerning 
premium payment procedures. The Act also incorporates 
a Code of ACC Claimants' Rights as well as allowing for 
the disclosure of information to the Depattment of Child. 
Youth and Family Services and for the reporting of 
medical errors to the relevant professional body and the 
Health and Disability Commissioner. 
Since 2001, there have been a number of amendments to 
' 
such as extending the no fault principle to medical 
misadventure and compensation for self-employed as 
well as greater discretion for rehabilitation. The 
amendment to the Act also bypasses the normal 
requirement to prove causation which is required for 
gradual process injuries or diseases. It also lists 25 
additional conditions or diseases to be added to Schedule 
2. Although many of the occupational diseases are rare, 
some are more common, such as noise induced hearing 
loss, dermatitis and some types of asthma caused by 
sensitizing agents or irritants inherent in the work 
process, for example sawdust (Accident Compensation 
Corporation, 2005). This change will have the greatest 
affect on industries where employees may be exposed to 
the risk of certain diseases. 
In summary, in the past century workers' compensation 
legislation has addressed, more or less, the issues 
relating to compensation, rehabilitation and prevention. 
Over the last thirty years the domain of workplace safety 
has been bifurcated as issues relating to the prevention of 
workplace injury and disease have been largely removed 
from the purview workers' compensation and placed into 
the domain of occupational health and safety. 
"A Modest proposal" (Swift, 1729) 
However, as stated above, after a century of the same 
basic workers' compensation structure, it may be time 
to consider ending the workers' compensation 
experiment. The stark truth is that after centuries of 
industria lization, every year hundreds of workers are still 
maimed and killed while working in New Zealand. 
Moreover, while the Woodhouse tenets are laudable, the 
fact is that his vision has been so corrupted that it could 
be argued that New Zealand's workers' compensation 
scheme no longer affords workers with comprehensive, 
real compensation and rehabilitation and it is time to 
rethink another strategy. The three key reasons for 
change in workers' compensation are as follows. 
First, the levels of compensation offered under workers' 
compensation are too low. Over the past century the 
amounts of compensation offered by workers' 
compensation schemes have declined (Turner, 2006). At 
the beginning workers' compensation was clearly a better 
option than no workers' compensation. However, since 
the 1960's the levels of compensation for workplace 
injuries and disease, when compared to compensation 
offered to victims of automobile or environmental injury, 
have worsened. In many jurisdictions not only do 
injured workers receive much less than similarly injured 
drivers, but also the amount of compensation leaves them 
and their families in poverty. Thus, the argument can be 
made that these days workers are bearing an 
unreasonable burden of the cost of workplace injury and 
disease as successive governments continue to reduce 
compensation. Medical coverage, for example, often 
provides for only limited medical services (such as short 
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periods of physiotherapy treatment or psychological 
counselling). 
Short-term income replacement is usually set at less 
than 1 00% of lost wages the rationale being that the 
injured workers have an 'incentive' to get back to work 
more quickly (Rosenman, 2000; ,arrish and Schofield, 
2005; Thompson, 2007). Moreover, long-term 
compensation rarely includes compensation for the 
impact of serious injury on a person's life as few schemes 
include compensation for loss of amenities of life which 
would take into account the impact of such injuries on 
one's abi lity to live life to the fullest - and longest 
(Quintan, 2004 ). 
Linked to the argument that the levels of compensation 
offered under workers' compensation are too low is that 
workers' compensation has become too expensive to be 
economically feasible (Sengupta, et al 2005). Indeed, 
similar arguments are used in the debate around public 
versus private health systems. The issue of costs 
incurred in operating a workers· compensation scheme 
raised by employers and by unions and workers are 
important but are often tied to ideology rather than fact. 
The pressure by employer associations to have the ACC 
privatised in whole or in part is predicated on the view 
that the marketplace can deliver a more cost efficient 
service. They point to rising workers· compensation 
levies yet do so often without making the connection 
between the rise in costs and the rise in work-related 
injuries. Interestingly, the Australians lament the fact 
that they never adopted the New Zealand workers· 
compensation system and instead have inherited their 
costly, complex and confusing private/public sector split 
(see for example Australian Productivity Commission 
Inquiry Report, 2004). Trade unions on the other hand 
are concerned over efforts to reduce employer levies and 
manipulate the number of claims in order to present a 
better financial view of ACC. The CTU argues that 
reduced compensation and rehabilitation shifts the costs 
from the ACC and the employer to the worker. 
Representatives of the CTU add that it is a conflict of 
interest to have employers managing employee injuries 
which are caused at the workplace and are linked to 
employer insurance premium 
Second, tort law would provide better compensation. 
Not only has workers· compensation undergone radical 
changes, but so has tort law (Wood. et al. 1995). Since 
workers' compensation was introduced in the late 19th 
Century, the common law has also continued to 
evolve. In the 1930's and the case of Donoghue v. 
Stevenson, the tort negligence has emerged as an 
effective tool to deal with complexities of injuries in all 
areas of modem life. yet is seen as not suitable to apply 
to the workplace. The reasoning behind the treating 
workers differently is reliant on a characterization of the 
workplace as the private domain of the employer and the 
view that the employment relationship as one master and 
servant. While tort law as it was in 1900 may ha,·e 
protected employers from workers' claims, it is unlikely 
that tort law of 2009 would do the same. There is of 
course the concern that tort law is too slow, cumbersome 
and that the outcome is uncertain. But if sufficient 
resources are given to the courts, workers' compensation 
cases could be heard and resolved quickly allowing both 
successful and unsuccessful claimants to progress (for 
example, unsuccessful claimants could seek other 
government redress) instead of being in an indeterminate 
state. In short, the view perpetuated for over half a 
century that workers· compensation is a better option for 
workers, based on the historical comparison between 
workers' compensation and to11, needs to be revisited as 
benefits of tort law have clearly been increasing while 
the benefits of obtaining workers' compensation has 
worsened over the past 50 years 
Third. tort liability would enhance prevention. In New 
Zealand workplace fatalities is high compared to most 
OECD countries, as outline in table I and yet compliance 
with occupational health and safety regulations is low. 
Moreover. enforcement resources have steadily declined 
over the past 20 years. leaving New Zealand with one of 
the lowest ratios of inspectors to workplaces in the 
OECD countries. As a result workplace hazards have 
become increasingly difficult to monitor and police. It is 
argued that a return to tort would enhance prevention by 
acting as an economic deterrence (see Lamm. 
2002). That is. employers would have increased 
incentive to ensw·e safe and healthy work place as the 
fmancial consequences of injured workers' suits would be 
unpredictable. The aspects of tort which lead it to be 
seen as a lottery could be minimized by regulation. For 
example. all employers could be required to cany 
insurance for workplace injw·y and for workers to carry 
no fault insw·ance if they so desired as is the case for 
motorises in most Canadian provinces. A return to tot1 
would also assist in allm,~ng compensation for 
workplace injury and disease to de,elop. The courts 
would. in effect, provide a public forum in which 
scientific evidence of new forms of injmy and diseases 
could be weighed and determined. In short. the common 
law through tort would pro\'ide a better. more flexible 
and fairer process for determining the rights of injured 
workers and their employers. 
Table 1: Workplace Fatalities across Countries 
Counn·v 
~ 
Fatalities Fatalities Accident 
Rate per Rate per 
I 00.000 I 00.000 
workers workers 
Austra I ia '275 3.2 2434 
Denmark 90 3.4 2561 
New Zealand 61 3.5 2699 
Norway 72 3.2 2446 
Sweden 77 1.9 1469 
United Kingdom 225 0.8 632 
United States 6821 5.2 3959 
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Similar questions are asked with respect to accidents and 
diseases involving motorists and consumers. And while 
in New Zealand all those injured by accident receive the 
same level of compensation, in other Anglo American 
jurisdictions levels of compensation for non work related 
injw·y is higher. Arguably, workers (and in New Zealand 
all of the injured) are subsidizing unsafe and unhealthy 
workplaces. To the extent that there is not fu ll 
compensation, the costs of work related injury and 
disease are shifted from the employer to the worker, from 
the commercial enterprise to the worker's family and 
community. Surely it must be asked at some point, why, 
if the ACC system is so efficient and cost effective, are 
compensation levels so much lower than in New 
Zealand. What pat1 of the savings have been passed on 
to the injw-ed? 
Conclusions 
As the debate over the future of workers' compensation 
both here in New Zealand and overseas continues, it may 
be time to ask new questions. Any proposed reform needs 
to be judged in the light of the principles set out by 
Woodhouse. So when the employers propose, as they 
always do, that costs be controlled. workers and unions 
might ask about fair compensation. When employers' 
demands include private insurance. then workers· 
demands should also include choice - the right to be 
covered b) an insw-er of their choosing. And when the 
levels of compensation no longer provide complete 
rehabilitation and the administrati\'e process no longer 
allows for fair and speedy adjudication and appeal, then 
the question has to be, "Why workers· compensation?" 
If the system is not meeting the needs of employers and 
is not fairly compensating injured and sick ·workers. then 
why not get rid of it? 
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